What Comes Beyond Membership?

Published on: 04.09.2026 | Author: Berrin Yeshil

What Comes Beyond Membership?

The New Reality of Türkiye–EU Relations in 2026

For years, one question has dominated relations between Türkiye and the European Union: will Türkiye become an EU member? In 2026, a more useful question is this: what kind of relationship can Ankara and Brussels build while accession negotiations remain stalled?

This is not a narrower question than the traditional membership debate. On the contrary, it more accurately reflects the state of the relationship. Türkiye remains a candidate country, yet accession negotiations have made no meaningful progress for years. The European Commission describes Türkiye both as a candidate country and as a key partner, while noting that accession negotiations have been at a standstill since 2018. [1]

That does not mean the relationship is frozen. Economic, trade, political, and security links between Türkiye and the EU remain active. Europe’s altered security environment and uncertainty in the global economy have made this interdependence more consequential.

The first half of 2026 brought that paradox into sharp relief. On 6 February in Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos reaffirmed Türkiye’s candidate status and stressed the strategic value of Türkiye–EU relations for regional stability and economic resilience. Their agenda included trade, investment, the Customs Union, regional connectivity, and support for refugees. [2]

A further high-level meeting took place in Ankara on 30 June between Hakan Fidan, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, and European Commissioners Marta Kos and Magnus Brunner. The discussions covered Türkiye–EU relations, trade, connectivity, migration, security, and foreign policy. [3] On 2 July, Istanbul hosted the EU–Türkiye High-Level Economic Dialogue. [4]

These developments show that Türkiye–EU relations can no longer be understood solely through the lens of accession negotiations. What is new is not that the prospect of membership has disappeared. It is that the relationship now has strategic importance beyond the accession process itself.

An Old Question Needs a New Framework

Türkiye’s relationship with European integration has a long history. The 1963 Ankara Agreement laid the foundations for institutional relations between Türkiye and the then European Economic Community. The Customs Union, agreed in 1995 and effective from 31 December 1995, deepened economic integration. Türkiye gained candidate status in 1999, and formal accession negotiations began in 2005. [5]

This history shows that economic integration and political convergence do not always proceed at the same pace. The tension between economic interdependence and political distance remains a defining feature of Türkiye–EU relations. [6]

Türkiye remains a candidate country today, but the accession process is stalled. The European Commission notes that the Council concluded in 2018 that the negotiations had effectively reached an impasse, while political and legal issues continue to constrain further progress. [1]

Yet the relationship has not been severed. Economic interdependence remains substantial. In 2025, EU exports to Türkiye amounted to €114.3 billion, while imports from Türkiye reached €103.3 billion. Total trade in goods was therefore approximately €217.6 billion. [7]

Türkiye and the EU are tied not only politically but also economically. The lack of progress on membership does not diminish the importance of the relationship. Instead, it poses a different question: how can such intensive economic and strategic ties be managed if membership is not realised in the foreseeable future?

The Significance of 2026

The significance of 2026 lies not only in the high-level meetings that took place. Movement is occurring simultaneously across several policy areas. In February, the European Commission put economic and trade cooperation, the Customs Union, regional connectivity, and support for refugees on the agenda. [2]

In June, the agenda widened to include migration, security, defence, connectivity, and foreign policy alongside trade and the economy. [3] The July economic dialogue added to that political momentum. [4]

Trade is now linked to economic security and supply-chain resilience. Migration is not merely a matter of border management; it also concerns mobility, visa policy, and political relations. Security, too, extends beyond NATO and forms part of a wider geopolitical picture stretching from the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the Middle East and Europe’s transport and energy connections.

Academic scholarship has long examined Türkiye–EU relations through the simultaneous interaction of membership, the Customs Union, migration, energy, transport, and security. [8] In 2026, however, this interconnectedness has become more visible at the political level as well.

The Customs Union Beyond Trade

The Customs Union is among the clearest examples of this shift. Having entered into force at the end of 1995, it became a principal instrument of Türkiye’s economic integration with the European economy. Historically, economic integration was viewed not as an end in itself, but as a means of moving closer to the European Community. [9]

Thirty years later, the conditions of global trade are very different. Digital trade, supply-chain security, the green transition, carbon-related mechanisms, and geopolitical risks have changed the meaning of economic security.

The EU is also reshaping its own customs system. On 26 March 2026, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament reached a political agreement on a major reform of the Union’s customs framework. Its central elements include greater digitalisation, improved risk management, and stronger economic security. [10]

This matters for Türkiye as well. Modernising the Customs Union is no longer simply a matter of “more trade.” It concerns the extent to which Türkiye will participate in Europe’s evolving economic and regulatory architecture.

The 16 July 2026 decision on the mutual recognition of Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) programmes between the EU and Türkiye is particularly illustrative in this context. The European Commission described it as a step toward closer customs cooperation within the existing Customs Union and more secure supply chains. The agreement will enter into force once the necessary structured exchange of information on operators’ status has been established. [11]

At first glance, this may appear to be a technical measure. In a wider context, it shows that economic integration between Türkiye and the EU can continue to deepen in specific areas even when accession negotiations do not advance.

A Changing Security Balance

The other major shift is in security. Europe’s security environment has changed substantially in recent years. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the growing strategic importance of the Black Sea, conflicts in the Middle East, and developments in the South Caucasus have reshaped how Europe views its own security.

In this setting, Türkiye’s geopolitical position has gained further significance. Türkiye is a NATO member located at the intersection of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. It is therefore increasingly difficult to treat Türkiye as a separate issue in European security debates.

This is also reflected in the European Commission’s assessment, which identifies Türkiye as a key EU partner on issues including security, migration, trade, and climate. [1] European and international analysts likewise increasingly place Türkiye within the context of European security. The question is no longer only whether Türkiye will join the EU, but also what role it can play in Europe’s changing security architecture. [12]

This helps explain why security and defence featured prominently in the June 2026 discussions. [3] For Türkiye, this creates an opportunity: security relations with the EU can develop as an autonomous field of cooperation based on common interests, rather than solely as a possible result of future membership.

A major constraint nevertheless remains. Shared interests do not automatically generate political trust.

Cooperation Without Enough Trust

The future of Türkiye–EU relations cannot be explained through common interests alone. Serious differences persist over the rule of law, democratic standards, fundamental rights, Cyprus, and approaches to foreign policy. The European Commission continues to place these issues at the centre of its assessment of Türkiye. [1]

This is one reason why Türkiye’s economic and strategic importance does not automatically lead to a revival of the accession process. Academic literature often describes such a situation through the idea of differentiated integration: a non-EU country can be closely integrated in particular fields without becoming a full member of the Union. [8]

Türkiye already has a multilayered relationship with the EU: a Customs Union, candidate status, and cooperation on migration, trade, energy, transport, and security. The picture is therefore neither one of complete convergence nor of complete estrangement. A more accurate description is that mutual need is growing, but political trust is not increasing at the same pace.

That is the central paradox of Türkiye–EU relations in 2026. The economy, security, migration, and regional developments bring the two sides closer together, while political and normative differences make it harder to construct a deeper institutional framework.

Three Possible Paths

The current situation points to three main possibilities.

1. Reviving the Accession Process

The first option is to restore the accession process as the central framework for the relationship. This would preserve membership as Türkiye’s long-term strategic objective and provide fresh political momentum. To make this possible, however, political and legal problems accumulated over many years would need to be addressed. European Commission reports indicate that serious differences remain precisely in the areas of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. [1] In the short term, this option does not appear easy.

2. Structured Strategic Cooperation

The second option is to preserve the membership perspective without making day-to-day relations entirely dependent on progress in the negotiations. This would mean more regular and institutionalised mechanisms for cooperation in trade, the Customs Union, security, migration, energy, transport, digitalisation, and scientific cooperation.

Such an approach would not require abandoning membership. The accession process and practical cooperation could develop through distinct but mutually reinforcing channels. The idea of relations beyond the traditional membership framework already occupies an important place in academic research on Türkiye–EU relations. [8; 13]

3. Continuing the Current Uncertainty

The third option is for the present situation largely to continue. Türkiye and the EU would cooperate where they share interests, but political differences would continue to prevent the creation of a more comprehensive framework.

In the short term, this may seem the easiest option. In the longer term, however, it may prove costly for both sides. The more interdependence grows, the greater the need for durable institutional mechanisms to manage it.

Conclusion

For years, Türkiye–EU relations were framed as a simple dilemma: would Türkiye become an EU member or not? The reality of 2026 shows that this framework is no longer sufficient.

Türkiye remains a candidate country, and the prospect of accession has not disappeared. At the same time, goods trade of approximately €217.6 billion in 2025, renewed high-level contacts in 2026, and concrete steps within the Customs Union show that Türkiye–EU relations extend far beyond accession negotiations. [1; 7; 11]

The future of the relationship should therefore not be framed solely through the question, “When will membership happen?” A more realistic approach is to view the accession process and strategic cooperation as two separate but mutually reinforcing channels.

This does not mean disregarding the political dimension of the relationship. On the contrary, sustained cooperation in the economy, security, and regional connectivity could create space for a gradual restoration of political dialogue. For Türkiye, such an approach could yield greater economic and strategic benefits from its relationship with the EU. For the EU, it could mean making more effective use of Türkiye’s economic potential, geopolitical position, and role in security.

However, this will require more than common interests, namely the capacity to manage differences.

Ultimately, the question that may determine the direction of Türkiye–EU relations in the coming years is not only whether Türkiye will become a member of the European Union. The more important question is whether Türkiye and the EU can manage the issues on which they disagree while developing the areas in which they can be partners. The answer may define the new reality of relations between Ankara and Brussels.

Sources / Използвани източници

1. [1] European Commission. “Türkiye – Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood.” Available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/turkiye_en (Accessed: 18 August 2026).
2. [2] European Commission. “Joint Statement by Turkish Foreign Minister H.E. Hakan Fidan and EU Commissioner for Enlargement H.E. Marta Kos Following Their Meeting in Ankara.” 6 February 2026. Available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-turkish-foreign-minister-he-hakan-fidan-and-eu-commissioner-enlargement-he-marta-kos-2026-02-06_en (Accessed: 18 August 2026).
3. [3] European External Action Service. “Joint Press Release by Türkiye’s FM Hakan Fidan, HR/VP Kaja Kallas and EU Commissioners Marta Kos and Magnus Brunner Following Their Meeting in Ankara.” 30 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-press-release-türkiyes-fm-hakan-fidan-hrvp-kaja-kallas-and-eu-commissioners-marta-kos-and_en (Accessed: 18 August 2026).
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