Published on: 28.09.2026 | Author: Dr. Gurakuç Kuçi
UN Monologue: Why Kosovo Cannot Respond to Serbia’s Accusations
When one state can make accusations while the accused party cannot respond, the problem is no longer merely political, but institutional. Kosovo’s case exposes a gap within the UN system that calls for reform.
By Dr. Gurakuç Kuçi – Professor at UNI College and External Associate at ISLH OCTOPUS
At the United Nations, a paradox that rarely receives attention is that a member state can use the rostrum of the General Assembly to level any accusations against Kosovo, while Kosovo itself does not enjoy the right to respond.
Such an asymmetry became apparent once again on September 23, when now former-Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic devoted a lengthy part of his address to Kosovo during the 81st session of the General Assembly, accusing the states that have recognized Kosovo’s independence of violating the UN Charter and international law. He then issued a threat, stating that Serbia would defend its territorial integrity, the Charter, and Resolution 1244. His accusations went so far as to accuse Kosovo of “ethnic cleansing” against Serbs.
Serbia, as a UN member state, has the right to speak and to express its positions; however, the problem does not lie with that right. What is problematic is the institutional architecture within which that right is exercised, where the party being discussed does not have an equivalent right or status allowing it to respond to the accusations in the same chamber.
This issue goes beyond symbolism.
In 2010, the International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, answered a question submitted through the General Assembly following an initiative by Serbia.
The question was: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”
The ICJ answered that international law had not been violated, nor had the UN Charter, Resolution 1244, or the UNMIK Constitutional Framework.
This response by the ICJ to Serbia’s initiative makes the current debate paradoxical: only Serbia is allowed to present its version of international law at the United Nations and to entirely disregard the ICJ’s response, while Kosovo cannot defend itself or challenge those interpretations from the same procedural position.
The Problem Is Not Only Membership
The General Assembly links the right of reply for delegations to a special status that allows participation in its proceedings. Under Rule 73, the President of the General Assembly may grant a member the right of reply. However, since Kosovo is not yet a UN member and does not hold any special observer status in the General Assembly, it does not automatically have access to this mechanism.
There are, however, precedents in which the General Assembly has granted special participation rights to various delegations, including the right of reply. This does not resolve the question of membership, but it creates a mechanism that enables a non-member party to participate more substantively in debates that directly concern it.
The paradox becomes even greater when Kosovo, although not recognized by countries such as China, India, or Spain, conducts regular trade with them and is part of the international system for the movement of goods, payments, and customs procedures. China alone accounts for more than one-tenth of Kosovo’s imports. Political non-recognition has therefore not prevented economic and legal interaction in practice; nevertheless, within the United Nations, Kosovo’s political status continues to deny it even the opportunity to respond to accusations made against it.
Kosovo’s UN membership remains hostage to political considerations arising from the vetoes of Russia and China in the UN Security Council, rather than to criteria of international law. This situation therefore legitimately raises the need for reform of the organization.
A Test for UN Reform
In his address before the UN General Assembly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for reform of the United Nations, arguing that the institution is failing to fulfil the mission for which it was created. Such a debate is not particularly new, but it has developed more extensively in academic circles than in political ones.
The debate over UN reform usually focuses on the veto, the composition of the Security Council, and the representation of emerging powers. The veto is the area in which Russia is most resistant to reform. At the same time, Russia is also the principal opponent of Kosovo’s membership in the United Nations and, once again on this occasion, made statements against Kosovo concerning the UN Charter and Resolution 1244 that run counter to the ICJ’s findings.
This call for reform should also encompass a fundamental procedural question: who has the right to speak when they are the direct subject of a debate or of a statement made by a state.
Such a reform would not require membership status and the right to be heard to be treated as the same issue. On the contrary, the United Nations could establish a procedural standard under which any party that becomes the direct subject of accusations in the General Assembly would have the opportunity to respond, regardless of whether or not it enjoys full membership status. This would separate the question of political status from the basic need for fair institutional debate.
At the same time, reform should not overlook the problem of membership. When the admission of a state depends on a recommendation from the Security Council, the veto of the permanent powers can turn a question of international representation into a hostage to geopolitical rivalries. Kosovo’s case shows that the consequences of such a blockage are not limited merely to the absence of a seat at the United Nations, but also affect its ability to participate in debates in which it is directly discussed.
Therefore, reform should proceed along two parallel tracks: reviewing the way political blockages affect the membership process and, until then, establishing a clear procedural right of reply. This would transform the issue from a privilege of status into a standard of institutional justice.