Published on: 10.11.2026 | Author: Evelina Soukou
Montenegro’s EU Accession on Croatia’s Terms?
Evelina Soukou
Evelina Soukou holds an MA in Peace, Security and Development, which she completed in Belgrade. Her research interests focus on the Western Balkans, identity politics, social cohesion, and the relationship between political institutions and societal change.
For years, EU integration was presented in the Western Balkans as the strongest incentive to overcome post-war divisions. The prospect of a shared European future was supposed to gradually loosen the past’s grip on politics. Relations between Montenegro and Croatia reveal a less reassuring side of that promise. The closer Podgorica moves towards accession, the more bargaining value unresolved historical disputes acquire for Zagreb. Issues left unsettled for decades suddenly carry greater political weight. What has changed is chiefly the two countries’ unequal institutional standing and the rising cost of delay for Montenegro. The European prospect creates a powerful incentive to compromise, but also allows an EU member to tie its consent to broader national claims. The real question is what kind of agreements emerge under such pressure. Diplomatic settlements can precede genuine reconciliation and, in some circumstances, make their political and public acceptance harder.
To assess this tension, it is worth comparing Croatia’s stated demands with the steps Montenegro has already taken, while examining how the prospect of accession changes the negotiating position of both countries. In October 2026, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković secured the removal of a reference to completing Montenegro’s accession negotiations by the end of the year from draft European Council conclusions. “Izmijenili smo, na našu inicijativu, zaključke” (“We amended the conclusions on our own initiative”), he said, explicitly linking the move to bilateral talks.[1] By 6 November, Montenegro had provisionally closed 23 of its 33 negotiating chapters.[2] Technical progress continued; the proposed political deadline did not survive. Plenković did not need to say “no”. Removing the “when” was enough. Zagreb gained room to apply pressure without bearing the political cost of an outright obstruction.
Nor does the closing of chapters settle the matter. A Croatian document circulated to EU member states links outstanding bilateral issues to parliamentary support for ratifying Montenegro’s eventual Accession Treaty.[3] A demand may therefore be assessed during negotiations and again at ratification. Croatia is bargaining not only over what a settlement should contain, but also over when it will count as sufficient. For Podgorica, making a concession does not guarantee that the issue will stay off the table.
Prevlaka shows why this matters. A provisional arrangement dating from 2002 allowed the area to be managed without a final border settlement.[4] Zagreb now seeks agreement on the land border, based on the boundaries of the former Yugoslav republics, before accession, while accepting continued talks on maritime delimitation without a deadline.[5] Why must one part be settled now while the other can wait? The two questions have distinct legal foundations. Yet Croatia’s proposal determines which part becomes an immediate accession condition and which may remain unresolved. For more than two decades, the interim arrangement made coexistence possible. EU accession has not changed the geography; it has changed the leverage of those negotiating its final settlement.
Regional experience offers no simple verdict. In 2015 Montenegro signed a border agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which entered into force in 2016, without the same member-state-candidate relationship.[6] Croatia, by contrast, joined the EU in 2013 with its dispute with Slovenia unresolved. In 2020, the Court of Justice of the EU held that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on that particular border dispute.[7] Zagreb therefore has sound reasons to seek credible agreements rather than leave unenforceable promises unresolved inside the Union. But demanding a workable settlement is not the same as having the right to dictate one unilaterally.
Accountability for wartime abuses cannot, moreover, be measured by the logic of a territorial bargain. The 1991 attack on Dubrovnik and the abuses committed at Morinj in 1991-1992 left responsibilities that the 2000 apology by Montenegro’s then-president, Milo Đukanović, could not erase.[8] Yet concrete steps have followed. According to figures from Montenegro’s Supreme Court, approximately €1.54 million in non-pecuniary damages was awarded in Morinj-related cases between 2013 and 2025.[9] The two countries also signed a protocol on missing persons in 2017.[10] None of this proves that justice is complete. It does justify asking a more precise question: which obligations remain unfulfilled, which have been inadequately implemented, and which are being added now? If the answer is simply “when Zagreb is satisfied”, the benchmark is political rather than verifiable. And when redress for victims is bundled with claims over the training ship Jadran and disputed property,[11] those seeking to deny wartime responsibility are handed a convenient argument: even accountability can be dismissed as a “national concession”. Victims should not become bargaining counters in disputes over unrelated claims.
Domestic politics deepens the trap. After the decisions on Kotor and Morinj, Croatia’s governing HDZ presented them as the result of Plenković’s intervention at the European Council.[12] The more Zagreb celebrates the outcome as a victory of pressure, the harder it becomes for Podgorica to defend it as a deliberate acknowledgement of historical responsibility. Montenegro, however, has also contributed to the tensions. Its 2024 resolution on Jasenovac followed internal disputes triggered by its support for the UN resolution on the Srebrenica genocide, and strained relations with Croatia.[13] Condemning the crimes committed at Jasenovac is historically warranted; the timing and political context suggest that historical memory also served domestic parliamentary calculations, with diplomatic consequences. The Spajić government cannot blame its neighbour alone when alliances on which it relies also fuel the dispute.
In Kotor, diplomacy quite literally passed through legislation. In October 2026, Montenegro amended its laws on sport and memorials, clearing the way to rename the municipal swimming pool honouring Zoran Gopčević, whom Croatia links to Morinj, and to authorise the memorial plaque at the former camp.[14] Government decisions followed.[15] President Jakov Milatović criticised the limited consultation and the handling of historical responsibility. The government settled two bilateral demands through general legislative changes without resolving the underlying domestic disagreement. That is not a negligible achievement, but it is not the same as reconciliation. The fall from eight Croatian demands to six concerns two matters that could be settled swiftly by political decision. Finding the missing and pursuing criminal accountability follow a different timetable. Plenković himself acknowledged that two of the six remaining demands are more complex.[16] The number of files closed improves the political scorecard; it does not necessarily measure how close the hardest issues are to resolution.
EU enlargement is also a lesson in political power. Once Montenegro joins, it will have a say in the accession of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no certainty it will adopt the same tactics. But it will know they are available. The EU teaches candidates not only what obligations they must meet, but also what leverage membership brings. If a dispute yields greater returns as an accession condition than through negotiations between equals, why surrender that advantage too soon? The most troubling precedent would not be a delay in Montenegro’s accession. It would be the belief that, in the enlargement process, some disputes become more valuable precisely because they remain unresolved.
Notes
- Croatian Radiotelevision (HRT), “Plenković: Crna Gora treba prionuti razgovorima s Hrvatskom, otvorena pitanja su rješiva,” October 16, 2026. Plenković: Crna Gora treba prionuti razgovorima s Hrvatskom, otvorena pitanja su rješiva - HRT. ↩
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, “Enlargement: EU and Montenegro Close Accession Negotiations on Free Movement of Goods and Food Safety,” November 6, 2026. Enlargement: EU and Montenegro close accession negotiations on free movement of goods and food safety - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood. ↩
- MINA, reporting on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Croatia Presents Eight Conditions to Montenegro Before EU Membership,” Vijesti, October 14, 2026. RFE/RL: Croatia presents eight conditions to Montenegro before EU membership. ↩
- United Nations Peacekeeping, “United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP): Background.” UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka - Background. ↩
- MINA, “Croatia Presents Eight Conditions to Montenegro Before EU Membership,” October 14, 2026 (see note 3). ↩
- United Nations Treaty Collection, “Agreement on the State Border Between Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” signed August 26, 2015; entered into force April 20, 2016. UNTC. ↩
- Court of Justice of the European Union, Slovenia v Croatia, Case C-457/18, judgment of January 31, 2020. EUR-Lex - 62018CJ0457 - EN - EUR-Lex. ↩
- Center for Democratic Transition, “Montenegro and Croatia: New and Old Problems and Their European Dimension,” Open Society Foundations Western Balkans, February 24, 2026. Montenegro and Croatia: New and old problems and their European dimension - Open Society Foundations Western Balkans. ↩
- Biljana Nikolić, “There Is No Basis, but I Can Come Up with One: Is There a Legal Possibility for New Financial Compensation for the Morinj Camp Inmates?”, Vijesti, September 20, 2025. There is no basis, but I can come up with one: Is there a legal possibility for new financial compensation for the Morinje concentration camp inmates?. ↩
- Ministry of Croatian Veterans, Republic of Croatia, “Potpisan protokol o međunarodnoj suradnji,” December 22, 2017. Ministarstvo hrvatskih branitelja Republike Hrvatske - Potpisan protokol o međunarodnoj suradnji. ↩
- Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, “Resolution of Outstanding Issues Between Croatia, Montenegro Essential for Completion of EU Accession Talks,” July 22, 2026. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia - Resolution of outstanding issues between Croatia, Montenegro essential for completion of EU accession talks. ↩
- Radio Television of Montenegro (RTCG), “HDZ: Odluke Crne Gore rezultat Plenkovićeve intervencije na Evropskom savjetu,” October 20, 2026. HDZ: Odluke Crne Gore rezultat Plenkovićeve intervencije na Evropskom savjetu :: Politika :: RTCG - Radio Televizija Crne Gore - Nacionalni javni servis. ↩
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Skupština Crne Gore usvojila rezoluciju o Jasenovcu, opozicija napustila glasanje,” June 28, 2024. Skupština Crne Gore usvojila rezoluciju o Jasenovcu, opozicija napustila glasanje. ↩
- Office of the President of Montenegro, “Predsjednik Milatović potpisao ukaze o proglašenju Zakona o dopuni Zakona o spomen-obilježjima i Zakona o dopunama Zakona o sportu,” October 16, 2026. Predsjednik Milatović potpisao ukaze o proglašenju Zakona o dopuni Zakona o spomen-obilježjima i Zakona o dopunama Zakona o sportu: Pratiće primjenu i postupanje nadležnih organa | Predsjednik Crne Gore. ↩
- Government of Montenegro, “Saopštenje o odlukama Vlade Crne Gore donijetim na telefonskoj sjednici održanoj 19. oktobra 2026. godine,” October 19, 2026. https://www.gov.me/clanak/saopstenje-o-odlukama-vlade-crne-gore-donijetim-na-telefonskoj-sjednici-odrzanoj-19-oktobra-2026-godine. ↩
- Croatian Radiotelevision (HRT), “Plenković o proširenju EU-a: Crna Gora može do cilja, Srbija mora definirati put,” November 3, 2026. Plenković o proširenju EU-a: Crna Gora može do cilja, Srbija mora definirati put - HRT. ↩
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