Published on: 26.09.2026 | Author: Moea Andreas Kapa
The Impact of Anti-Immigration Vigilantism in South Africa, and Land Reclamation in Lesotho, on Lesotho-South Africa Integration Prospects.
by Moea Andreas Kapa
Master's student at the University of Yaoundé II in Cameroon.
Abstract
While the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa share deep structural economic, geographical, and resource interdependencies, state-level integration efforts such as the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC) followed by the Binational Commission, as well as SACU agreements and the LHWP joint projects, are increasingly challenged and stalled by divergent populist nationalist movements at the grassroots level. From the theoretical perspective of neo-functionalism particularly through its spill-back assumption, this paper discusses the impacts of anti-immigrant vigilantism from South Africa, and land reclamation from Lesotho, on the Lesotho-South Africa integration prospects. It outlines the current relations between Lesotho and South Africa which constitute their respective foreign policies toward each other. The paper delves further, by discussing integration efforts embarked on by Lesotho and South Africa, as well as subsequent impact confronting such posed by Operation Dudula, ‘March and March’ and calls for land reclamation from both states. Owing to this, the paper assesses prospects of integration efforts embarked on by Lesotho and South Africa, being realised and recommendations for such.
Key words: Anti-Immigration, Vigilantism, Land Reclamation, Integration, Prospects
Introduction
The geopolitical landscape of Southern Africa entails a complex, asymmetrical relationship between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa. Entirely landlocked by its larger, economically dominant neighbour, Lesotho presents a classic study of the "small state dilemma". With a land area of approximately 30 500 km2 and a population of 2.1 million according to Roux (2025), Lesotho’s survival is historically and structurally bound to South Africa, which spans over 1,213090km2, and a population of 63.1 million according to Trading Economics (2026). Since attaining independence in 1966, Lesotho's foreign policy has navigated varying degrees of dependence, fluctuating between collaborationist, assertive, and submissive postures in response to Pretoria's overwhelming economic, military, and administrative hegemony. Despite the structural asymmetry, the mutual significance of both states remains undeniable. South Africa relies heavily on Lesotho for its water security, primarily through the multi-phased Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which channels millions of cubic meters of water to South Africa's industrial heartland in Gauteng. Conversely, Lesotho depends on South Africa for employment remittances, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenue, and access to global markets.
However, bilateral cooperation efforts anchored on this interdependence, traditionally coordinated through mechanisms like the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC) and the recently established Binational Commission, are increasingly threatened by emerging divergent nationalist currents in both nations. In South Africa, the rise of populist, anti-immigrant vigilante movements such as Operation Dudula as well as March and March, has fostered intense xenophobic sentiments, resulting in the violent exclusion and harassment of undocumented foreign nationals, including Basotho. Simultaneously, in Lesotho, a strong irredentist movement spearheaded by the Basotho Covenant Movement (BCM), demands the reclamation of vast territories lost to South Africa during the colonial era. This combination of populist anti-migrant violence in South Africa and irredentist claims in Lesotho, creates a diplomatic deadlock. While both governments continue to sign Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on economic and security cooperation, grassroots realities reveal a growing divergence between state-level integration goals, and societal-level resistance. Consequently, the survival of the JBCC and the Binational Commission initiatives, and ultimately integration likelihood of both states, becomes highly uncertain. It is therefore against this background, that the primary objective of this study is to analyse the impact of anti-immigration vigilantism in South Africa, and the land reclamation agenda in Lesotho on integration prospects between these two states. The study consists of themes which include, literature entailing definitions of anti-immigration, vigilantism, integration, xenophobia and irredentism. Second within the literature theme, is the theoretical underpinnings of integration, and the phenomenon of xenophobia underlying anti-immigrant vigilantism in South Africa, and irredentism underlying land reclamation in Lesotho. Subsequent to that, the relevant theoretical underpinning and lenses of the study is discussed. The historical context of the current Lesotho-South Africa relations are unfolded in this study, as well as cooperation efforts explored thus far. The study also details obstacles posed on the identified cooperation efforts, by anti-immigrant vigilantism in South Africa, and land reclamation agenda in Lesotho. Owing to these, the study evaluates the likelihood of integration, as well as recommendations, mainly relying on secondary sources of data which include articles, theses, and scientific journal articles, obtained from online libraries. the study is grounded in qualitative desk research that relies on secondary sources of data, including journal articles, theses, online news reports, and published papers obtained from online libraries. Covering a historical timeline that spans from the pre-nineteenth-century colonial era to recent events up to 2026, the paper uses these sources to trace the evolution of Lesotho–South Africa relations, evaluate current bilateral cooperation frameworks, and analyse the disruptive impact of anti-immigrant vigilantism and land reclamation movements. Ultimately, these secondary accounts are synthesized through the theoretical lens of neo-functionalist "spill-back" to assess the likelihood of regional integration and demonstrate how grassroots populist currents destabilize top-down state initiatives. Concluding remarks are thus provided. This discussion aims to address how land reclamation sentiments from Lesotho, and anti-immigration vigilantism is South Africa, impact the integration prospects between Lesotho and South Africa.
Definition of concepts
Bendrat (n.d.) defines anti-immigration to be a rhetoric entailing the use of language, narratives, and symbolism to vilify, marginalise, or demonise immigrants. It is premised on strategies aimed at fostering fear, distrust, and resentment towards immigrant communities. This anti-immigration often portrays immigrants as invaders, criminals, or drains on resources, perpetuating stereotypes and prejudices and conflated with issues of national security, cultural preservation, and economic competition, framing immigrants as existential threats to the host society. Vigilantism as defined by Gardenier (2022), is collective practices by non-state actors, aimed to enforce social or judicial norms, through taking the law into their hands. It involves citizens acting collectively to exercise social control or administer justice to acts they perceive as deviant.
Akhromkin, Riznyk, Varaksina, Balak and Herman (2024), define integration as the interdependence of national economies, involved in international trade. It is aimed at suppressing prejudice in the interaction between national economies. Akhromkin et al., (2024) further outline that integration is implemented on bilateral or multilateral trade formats, where there is reduction of trade barriers. Xenophobia according to Mogweku (2005, as cited in Solomon and Kosaka, 2013), is fear or hatred of strangers, embodied in discriminatory behaviour and attitudes, and exhibited through violence, as well as abuses of all types. Harris (2001, as cited in Solomon and Kosaka, 2013), states that xenophobia is premised on fear of loss of social status and identity, a perceived or real threat to citizens’ economic success, or as a manner of reassuring the national self and its boundaries during a national crisis. Irredentism according to Baird (2015), is a position which advocates that a nation-state on basis of ethnic, geographical, cultural or historical ties, annex territory controlled or within boundaries of another state. It is associated with nationalisation especially ethnonationalism.
Literature Review
As defined above. Integration emphasises national economies’ interdependence on a bilateral or multilateral stage. It is paired with theoretical assumptions such as the functionalist theory. Mitrany (1943, as cited in Suska, 2024), emphasises the functionalist theory to be coined on benefits and durability of community formed on a basis of functional activity. Such benefits include peace as the rationale of a constitution of an international community, and its appropriate structure serving as a conflict prevention mechanism. The second benefit and rationale underpinned within the functionalist theory of integration, is the anticipated “spill-over’’ effect. Such an effect results from cooperation in one field, necessitating its extension in other fields. Integration should begin in the economic sector, where the potential for cooperation is highest. By prioritizing economic integration, nations can gradually deepen their international ties through practical, everyday collaboration. David Mitrany (1943) maintained that by separating political agendas from technical and economic spheres, cooperation could serve as a self-driving engine for broader unity.
In addition to functionalism, is neo-functionalism which according to Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2015), mainly assumes process of regional integration to depend on the realisation of mutual gains from cooperation in policy arenas, characterised by high levels of functional interdependence. Neo-functionalism posits integration to entail a regional spike in economic interdependence, driven by the elimination of cross-border barriers and the establishment of shared regulatory frameworks. Additionally, these economic gains do not pool around a single hegemonic leader but instead, are distributed relatively evenly across all member states, driving an upward convergence where historically less-developed nations gradually catch up to top performers. Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2015) further state that beyond wealth generation and distribution, the bloc secures a high level of mutual security as a collective shield against external predation, and as a mechanism to safeguard internal material gains. Because these tangible rewards are felt by the population at large, they generate widespread public support and passive consent, creating a stable foundation for the organisation to smoothly expand its authority. Furthermore, the undeniable utility of these shared gains ensures voluntary compliance, where member states willingly enforce decisions without the central authority needing a monopoly on violence, while a robust legal framework effortlessly resolves any distributive disputes or implementation hiccups (Schmitter and Lefkofridi, 2015).
However, benefits of integration according to Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2015), neo-functionalism can explain and predict 'spill-backs', which are instances where member states claw back authority from supranational institutions, potentially leading to fragmentation or total exit as in the case of Brexit and Grexit. This latter assumption of neo-functionalism, pertains to challenges by irredentist sentiments underpinning land reclamation in Lesotho, and xenophobia underpinning anti-immigrant vigilantism in South Africa, holistically bedevilling integration efforts between these two states. This phenomenon of xenophobia according to Olofinbiyi (2022), is deeply rooted in shaping human history, stemming from the ethnocentric nature of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Their cultural imperialism premised on their ethnocentric nature, was entrenched towards enslavement of those of different origins and race. Romero and Zarrugh (2018, as cited in Olofinbiyi, 2022), opine that there is global evidence of history of xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants and foreign nationals, which led to evolvement of violence, hate crime, severe discrimination, genocide, as well as religious and ethnic crises.
Olofinbiyi (2022) indicates that, the most pointed and widely cited case of xenophobia, is that of anti-Semetism, which resulted in the massacre of six million European Jews and untold others during the World War II Holocaust. Foner and Alba (2018, as cited in Olofinbiyi, 2022), further add that a new form of xenophobia emerged in Western Europe and North America during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century as Islamophobia, mainly targeting migrant Muslim communities with or without citizenship. Other empirical instances of xenophobic violence, include but not limited to, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the Hinduphobia against Indians in Australia during 2009, and the Yugoslavia War between 1991 to 1995, ethnic conflicts resulting into deaths of Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Slovenes (Olofinbiyi, 2022).
Xenophobia transcended and seeped into the African continent, as evident in cases of the Rwanda genocide which resulted in casualties of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi Bantu-minority ethnic group. Most notably, xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa, is marked by a surge of anti-immigrant violence. It has been exacerbated by a high number of casualties, particularly in the Gauteng, Western Cape, Free State, Limpopo and Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) provinces (Olofinbiyi, 2022).
Nyamnjoh (2006, as cited in Ogunnoiki, 2020), states drivers of xenophobia in South Africa, emerge from two distinct levels being international and domestic. From a global perspective, the primary catalyst is globalisation. As international borders soften and world economies become deeply interconnected, South Africa has experienced a significant influx of economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. These individuals arrive largely from Asian nations like Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as numerous African countries, including Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ultimately, this rapid demographic shift, intensifies local anxieties regarding national identity and resources, fueling a defensive obsession with citizenship that manifests as xenophobia. From a domestic perspective, Ogunnoiki (2020) outlines vestiges of Apartheid, where the racial segregation of Black South Africans and subsequent violent liberation struggle, left many Black South Africans psychologically scarred. Adding to this, is according to Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni (2011, as cited in Ogunnoiki, 2020), the failure of the post-apartheid South African government to adequately provide economic opportunities and resources for locals which include jobs, housing, schools and healthcare.
Nagle (2025), describes irredentism to be based on two beliefs; first being that lost lands constitute irrevocable parts of a nation, and second being that people to be retrieved are members of the national family. Most pertinent to the first belief, is an irredentist framework based on myth of ancient statehood. Nagle (2025) describes this irredentist myth of ancient statehood, to articulate and claim that a kin state and kin group, belonged to a sovereign and independent state with unlimited rule over a territory and those in it. It emphasises that boundaries of an ethnic nation, are intertwined with those of another state and such a nexus ceased upon the unlawful demarcation by foreign forces. Agnew and Krasner (2005; 2009, as cited in Nagle, 2025), state that such is a ‘myth’ in a manner that albeit there being historical evidence such as medieval kingdoms commonly inhabiting territory, such a myth preys on a more modern construct resulting from Westphalian notions of effective sovereignty, authority, central state authority and potential territoriality.
Nagle (2025) further opines that, the idea of an ancient history detailing congruity of nation-state as a sovereign, bounded political unit, is central within this irredentist framework, and adopted by irredentists. Silber and Little (1997, as cited in Nagle, 2025), cite Croatia’s claims over parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resulted in a violent secessionist entity, declaring independence from Bosnia on July 5th, 1993. Another notable case cited by Anzulovic (1999, as cited in Nagle, 2025), is there being an idea of a Greater Hungary, predicated on returning to the boundaries of the ancient ‘state’ of King Steven, and a Greater Serbia formed by parameters of the Serbian Empire founded by Dušan the Mighty. Another case is that of the Romanian irredentists, who invoked the seventeenth century Kingdom of Michael the Brave, which temporarily united the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania (Nagle, 2025).
This phenomenon of irredentism, according to Falode (2005), seeped into the African continent, with cases such as claims of Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula, and that of Eritrea and Ethiopia over Badme. Another is Togo claimed by Ghana on grounds of Ewe reunification, and Somalia claiming Somaliland as being part of a greater Somalia. Other cases are the Ethiopia-Eritrean war over the borderland of Badme, and Algeria and Morocco over the Spanish Sahara.
Theoretical Framework
The commonality of both the irredentism and xenophobia phenomena, have as domestic challenges in Lesotho and South Africa respectively, been grounded or narrowed down on bearing a semblance of nationalism. This is pertinent particularly to the realism theory, which Donnelly (2000), describes to emphasise constraints on politics imposed by human nature, compounded by an absence of an international government. The realism theory posits that the international relations realm, is characterised by precedence of power and interest. It adopts six paradigms derived from postulations by Thomas Hobbes, Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Thucydides and Machiavelli.
For Hobbes, human beings are fundamentally equal, making the weakest person capable, strong or cunning enough, to kill the strongest; driven by three core motives: competition for material gain, diffidence (distrust) for safety, and glory for reputation. In the absence of an overarching government, this rough equality of capabilities and inherent drive, leads to a state of perpetual fear and anticipation. As a result, pre-emptive strikes become logical and justified as self defense, ultimately reducing human life to a condition of an all-out war. Although humans possess reason and passions that incline them toward peace, Hobbes argues that agreements are useless without a central authority to enforce them, as fixed human nature will inevitably override rules without the threat of punishment. Consequently, escaping this anarchic state requires surrendering individual freedom, to a sovereign domestic power capable of keeping everyone in awe. Although on an international scale, sovereign states remain trapped in a perpetual state of war like gladiators with weapons pointed at one another, as no global government exists to enforce peace. Donnelly (2000) further states that Hans Morgenthau, adopted six principles in his approach to political realism, establishing a framework for international politics centered on the autonomous pursuit of power, driven by an unyielding view of human nature. Morgenthau posits that international relations are governed by objective laws rooted in human psychology, requiring foreign policy to be guided by national interest defined primarily in terms of power as a concept whose core remains constant even as its specific content evolves across different historical and cultural contexts. Crucially, political realism rejects the application of universal moral principles to state craft, arguing that nations cannot afford to sacrifice survival for abstract morality or mistake their own ideological ambitions for universal ethical laws. Ultimately, Morgenthau asserts the strict autonomy of the political sphere, establishing that foreign policy decisions must be analyzed through the pragmatic lens of power and national security rather than through legalism, economics, or moralism.
Kenneth Waltz introduces the third realist paradigm being structural realism (or neorealism). It asserts that the enduring patterns of international politics, are not driven by human nature or domestic institutions, but instead by the systemic constraints of an anarchic international system. Unlike hierarchical domestic systems characterised by clear authority and functional specialisation, international relations is an anarchic domain, composed of functionally identical, autonomous states bound to operate in a self-help environment to guarantee their own survival. As a result, states differ not in their basic objectives or functions, but in their relative capabilities. This means international structures are defined primarily by the distribution of power among great powers, particularly in bipolar or multipolar configurations. Because no overarching authority exists to protect weakening states, actors in anarchy are compelled by structural incentives to "balance" against rising powers rather than "bandwagon" with them, as aligning with a dominant state risks eventual destruction (Donnelly, 2000).
The fourth paradigm as stated by Donnelly (2000), is the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game theory model, which captures the structural dynamics of political realism and the security dilemma in international relations. In its standard matrix defined by the preference ordering of Temptation over Reward, Penalty, and the Sucker’s payoff, two rational actors are incentivised to defect and maximize individual gain, and avoid the catastrophic outcome of being exploited, leading to mutual defection even though mutual cooperation would yield a substantively superior result. Applied to international politics, international anarchy functions like an inescapable Prisoners’ Dilemma, because the lack of an overarching enforcement body, prevents states from making binding cooperation pacts or eliminating the fear of betrayal. This structural reality fuels the security dilemma, wherein defensive measures taken by one state inherently threaten others, triggering an escalating spiral of mutual suspicion and militarization regardless of initial intentions. Furthermore, the presence of even a few unscrupulous actors enforces a law of the lowest level, which compels peaceful states to act guardedly or aggressively out of self-preservation. Ultimately, this framework demonstrates that without structural enforcement mechanisms or altered preferences, the systemic conditions of anarchy force rational states into a descending cycle of competition, creating an insurmountable distance between their desire for peace and their actual geopolitical outcomes.
The fourth paradigm by Thucydides, epitomises the stark conflict between moral aspirations and the brutal imperatives of power. Drawn from the history of the Peloponnesian War and Demand of the surrender of the neutral island of Melos, it details the Athenian envoys to have explicitly banished talk of justice or noble principles, insisting that right and wrong only apply between equals in power, with the maxim, the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. Presenting their empire's dominance as the result of a timeless law of nature driven by fear, honour, and interest, the Athenians argue that expediency ensures security, whereas pursuing abstract concepts like justice and honour invites ruin. This prediction tragically validated when the Melians resist and suffer complete slaughter and enslavement. A parallel realist logic appears in earlier Athenian speeches at Lacedaemon, where envoys justify their coercive rule by claiming it is standard human behaviour for the weaker to be subject to the stronger, while dismissing their rivals' appeals to justice as mere opportunistic hypocrisy. Ultimately, these arguments of the Athenian envoys, demonstrate a consistent, law-like model of international relations where survival, power, and necessity unconditionally override considerations of morality (Donnelly, 2000).
The last paradigm of the realism theory according to Donnelly (2000), is Niccolò Machiavelli’s radical early-modern political realism through his deeply cynical view of human nature and his total subordination of morality to political survival. Viewing humanity as inherently ungrateful, fickle, malignant, and driven to do good only when forced to by necessity, Machiavelli argues that power, security, and the art of war must be a prince's sole concerns. He further asserts that good laws are meaningless without strong arms to back them. In a world where men judge actions entirely by outcomes and praised results justify any means, Machiavelli champions the pragmatic use of statecraft and even sensational violence, to satisfy, awe, and subdue a volatile populace. Far from mere senseless brutality, this endorsement of exemplary cruelty stems from his realist conviction that because human nature is stubbornly egoistic and vicious, rulers must master the terrifying necessity of entering into evil and using ferocious force to maintain political order and state security.
Building on the aforementioned realist theory as well as its outlined paradigms, the central theoretical framework of this study is neo-functionalism, particularly through its spill-back phenomenon. As mentioned above by Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2015), neo-functionalism mainly assumes process of regional integration to depend on the realisation of mutual gains from cooperation in policy arenas, characterised by high levels of functional interdependence. It posits that integration entails a regional surge in economic interdependence, driven by the elimination of cross-border barriers and the establishment of shared regulatory frameworks. However, Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2015), highlight 'spill-backs' in neo-functionalism, which are instances where member states claw back authority from supranational institutions, potentially leading to fragmentation or total exit as in the case of Brexit and Grexit.
Niemann (2006, as cited in Macmillan, 2008), suggests that the spillback effect may result from a spillover effect, being stalled by leaders wary of ceding sovereignty to supranational institutions. This stall may emerge from national traditions and identities. Spillback can also occur in the event of governments being constrained by its domestic groups such as opposition parties, lobby groups, media or public opinion, as well as structural limitations. This was evident in the case of according to Niemann, Edwards, and Jakobi (2021), public opinion in the United Kingdom, being constantly unsympathetic towards the European Union, even though, Curtice and Evans (2015, as cited in Niemann, Edwards, and Jakobi, 2021), opine Eurosceptics to have not previously been in a majority. Guerra and McLaren (2016, as cited in Niemann, Edwards, and Jakobi, 2021), state that this lack of enthusiasm for the EU from the public, tied up with issues relating to the British economy and immigration, British history and identity, transcended to an overall trust in the EU, visions about its future, and beliefs in the benefits of EU membership. Diversity can also be another factor of spillback, as common positions or policies, may necessitate one or more member state(s) to deviate from deeply rooted policies, customs and structures (Niemann, 2006, as cited in Macmillan, 2008).
While neo-functionalism posits that functional economic cooperation generates a spill-over effect indicative of states’ deeper unity, a spill-back occurs when domestic political pressures, identity conflict, and public backlash compel governments to claw back authority and construct new barriers. In this context, anti-immigrant vigilantism in South Africa, forces the South African state to diverge from seamless border integration, and gravitate toward securitized controls. Concurrently, the rise of irredentist land reclamation demands in Lesotho, re-ignites historical territorial grievances that erode diplomatic trust, and paralyze top-down integration current gains and initiatives. Ultimately, these dual forces of xenophobic violence and territorial populism, act as domestic constraints that override functional economic gains, driving both nations back into nationalist fragmentation, border tightening, and geopolitical deadlock.
Historical Context of Lesotho-South Africa Current Relations
Thahane (1974) states that prior to the nineteenth century, Basotho along with other tribal groups such as the Zulu, settled within the interior of Southern Africa. Thus in the 1830s upon Boers moving away from the British rule and its stronghold in the Cape Province, inevitably engaged in many battles with African tribes inhabiting these interiors of the sub-continent. Confronted by superior European weapons and under the leadership of King Moshoeshoe I, Basotho retreated from flat lands, to mountainous terrains for fortification. From this plateau, Basotho successfully repelled the Boers in their expansion, while also seeking protection from the British. Eventually, the sought protection by Basotho to the British, was granted in 1868. Such however came at a cost of a ceasefire line being declared as the boundaries of the current enclaved Lesotho, and its vast former territory lost to modern-day South Africa (Thahane, 1974).
The geographical ties of Lesotho and South Africa, and genesis of subsequent interdependence, became supplanted during the period of mineral discoveries in South Africa. The discovery of large gold reserves in South Africa around 1896, following that of diamonds in 1867, transformed South Africa into a mining giant within Southern Africa according to Harington, McGlashan, Chelkowska, and Schutte (2004;1977, as cited in Suping, 2022). With the mining industry being South Africa’s biggest employment source, labour demand grew beyond the capacity of the local population at that time. As a result, mines mobilised inter-continental migrant labour which spanned into Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. This inter-continental recruitment further swelled after the post Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1901, where mines adopted an expansion programme where more than sixty thousand (60,000) Chinese were recruited between 1903 and 1906 (Suping, 2022:1).
Prior to the aforementioned inter-continental labour recruitment into South Africa’s mines heavily featuring Basotho, Maliehe (2021) states that new agricultural technologies, variants of fruit trees, vegetables and grain had been introduced by the missionaries in Lesotho. As a result, vibrant commercial centres in mission stations within Lesotho emerged, profited from by the local elite and commoners. In the 1840s and 1850s, Lesotho’s significance at its highest in the new regional economy, was based on supplying the heavily dependent Eastern Cape and Free State with grain, wool, mohair, cattle and skins (Maliehe, 2021). The diamond discovery in South Africa was at first more of an economic opportunity for Lesotho, as Basotho supplied new mining towns with grain and livestock. However, the economic and political advances made from the discovery by Basotho were short-lived due to conflicts with the Boers over land and livestock (Maliehe, 2021:30).
First, this discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa later entailed the emergence of new power dynamics which favoured the British. After prevailing over the Boers’ resistance over gold wealth in the 1890s, the British adopted a more aggressive imperial policy of extracting cheap labour. This, coupled with protracted warfare during the 1850s and 1860s, and eventual loss of territory to the Boers, resulted in Basotho being confronted by economic stagnation and loss of economic independence (Maliehe, 2021). Second, now annexed to the British, Lesotho’s traditional authority was bound to enforce British colonial laws within its community. Lesotho was therefore bound by virtue of annexation, to finance the colonial government primarily through tax. The colonial architecture in Lesotho relied on Basotho’s willingness to meet tax conditions, which the chieftainship was instrumental in enforcing. Third, upon introducing the Hut Tax in 1870, the British had allowed payments in different forms, to which many Basotho paid with livestock. Soon thereafter, however, the colonial regime shifted and insisted on money-based tax, which asymmetrically pulled Basotho into the colonial power metrics and market economy (Maliehe, 2021). The discovery of minerals in South Africa at this point was a decisive shift for Basotho, as they had lost bargaining power, influence, and economic independence. Lesotho was subjected to unfavourable conditions from the British, which forced Basotho men to work for wages in South African mines (Maliehe, 2021:34).
The finality of Lesotho’s economic influence and independence initially enjoyed in the 1840s and 1850s came in the late nineteenth century. Maliehe (2021) states that Lesotho was ravaged by severe drought from 1894 to 1898, following several locust plagues in the 1890s. Moreover, in 1891, there was a rinderpest outbreak which rapidly affected four in five of Basotho cattle. The inevitable resultant famine ensued upon the Free State halting livestock importation from Basotho. This was exacerbated by the Free State also imposing tariffs on grains imported from Lesotho, to protect Boer crop farmers. The railway lines linking coastal areas with the interior were completed in the 1890s, thus utilised by the Cape to import cheaper grain from Australia instead of from Lesotho (Maliehe, 2021).
The British had consolidated power over Basotho through controlling their chiefs and Lesotho’s economy. Albeit successful in their control and ensuring that Lesotho remained tied to the regional market economy, the British left everyday politics of governance to Basotho. This indicated the British’s acknowledgement of geopolitical entities through suzerainty on one hand, and economic control on the other, in its strife for economically pragmatic options to administer Lesotho. This amalgamation of power dynamics and pragmatism, were the basis of Lesotho’s integration into the Customs Union Agreement (Maliehe, 2021).
Initially a colonial goal, Lesotho’s integration into the Customs Union aimed at incorporating the country into what became modern day South Africa. The British integrated Lesotho into the Customs Union Commission in 1891, albeit under a protocol which categorised Lesotho as second class, with diminishing rights and no voting rights. This categorisation was premised on the assumption that the High Commissioner would act in Lesotho’s interests, despite its imports being insignificant relative to those of other colonies, and did not attach importance to the tariff (Maliehe, 2021). The subsequent Union of South Africa established by the South African Act of 1909, consolidated British colonies and Boer republics into one country. To avoid hostility by not hastily advance towards mainly incorporating the High Commission Territories into the Union, the 1910 Customs Union Agreement was signed, as a temporary resolution. The Agreement established an economic partnership between the British High Commission Territories and the Union. It established a revenue sharing mechanism, where members proportionally received an average amount of total customs, and exercise duties collected within a common revenue pool (Maliehe, 2021).
Integration Efforts between Lesotho and South Africa
On a regional or multilateral level, Lesotho and South Africa according to International Trade Administration (2025), are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), along with Eswatini, Botswana and Namibia. Managed by South Africa, member states benefit from a duty-free trade, while extending a common external tariff on imports from the rest of the globe. Lesotho also benefits from the free trade agreements which SACU established with other countries or trade blocs (International Trade Administration, 2025).
Mokoena and Balkaran (2018) state that albeit Lesotho reinstated parliamentary democracy in 1993, and South Africa underwent its democratic transformation in 1994, interaction between governments of both states became relaxed, however confronted by tense legalistic and diplomatic forms of border relations. This in addition to wounds that both nations suffered at the hands of each other, necessitates a lot of work to be done (Mokoena and Balkaran (2018). Mokoena and Balkaran (2018) further outline that, the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC) was established in attempt to strengthen relations between Lesotho and South Africa. The JBCC agreement was signed on the 19th April 2001 in Maseru Lesotho, where it stated that the Commission would operate at two levels namely; the Council of Ministers and the Council of Senior Government Officials from both countries. The Agreement was further reinforced in 2010, by then President Jacob Zuma’s commitment that from Lesotho-South Africa cooperation, Lesotho would ascend from a least developed status, to that of a developing country. This would result from the JBCC agreement which President Zuma stated by virtue of signing, sought to promote political, economic and social cooperation (Mokoena and Balkaran, 2018).
Zuma further outlined milestones already achieved through the JBCC such as the bilateral projects including the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) Phase II, Metolong Project and Sani Top road construction, all expected to provide a strong foundation for economic growth and development (Mokoena and Balkaran, 2018).
Moreover, according to Government of Lesotho (2025), a second session of the Binational Commission took place on April 22nd, 2025, where at least six (6) Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) in areas of economic cooperation, defense, basic education and social development were signed. This follows a reciprocal agreement between Lesotho and South Africa being sealed for usage of passport and visa, aimed to advance towards visa free movement from the current ninety (90) days visa-free travel limit upheld in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Government of Lesotho, 2025).
Obstacles to Integration efforts by anti-immigrant vigilantism in South Africa, and irredentist sentiments in Lesotho.
Nbemachena, Mawere and Mtapuri (2022) state that, on January 6th 2022, proponents of Operation Dudula, precipitated through ransacking the Tsietsi Mashinini Hub in Soweto, where foreign nationals and unauthorised migrants had rendered a haven. In addition, allegations of intimidation of immigrant vendors in Soweto and Johannesburg emerged in mid-January 2022, along with the subsequent march by Soweto and Alexandra residents to Hillbrow and Orange Grove, to forcefully evict undocumented foreign nationals. The premise of accusing foreign nationals of increasing crime rates and drug use in South Africa, was added on by the Dudula groupings, attributing rising unemployment and shortage of economic opportunities mainly to the presence of foreign nationals (Nbemachena, Mawere and Mtapuri, 2022).
Ntšonyane (2025) states that the Basotho Action Party (BAP), has expressed concern over increasing vulnerability of Basotho, many of whom travel to South Africa for economic opportunities, facing exclusion and discrimination particularly in the health sector. This concern from BAP, emerges amid mounting reports of South African citizens, forcibly removing undocumented foreign nationals from ques in public hospitals, on demands for them to produce legal documents to access medical services. Such was compounded by Operation Dudula’s activities further extending through according to Motaung (2025), foreign nationals including Basotho even those with legal documents, being turned away from public hospitals and clinics across South Africa.
Malataliana (2025) indicates that, albeit a crucial meeting and high-level talks having being convened in Pretoria, specifically to address the protection of Basotho and halt their rampant denial to healthcare, reports of xenophobic sent-aways remained unabated. Therefore, many of the six hundred and forty thousand (640000) Basotho, reportedly remain deprived of access to health rights guaranteed to foreign nationals by the South African Constitution and Refugee Act.
The aforementioned activities perpetrated by Operation Dudula, compounding the already existing yet waning bilateral corporation towards integration between Lesotho and South Africa, have significantly hindered integration efforts between these countries. Instead, such activities left unabated have fostered anti-migrant sentiment, creating barriers to essential services, and increasing cross-border tensions. The group's actions, which focus on putting South Africans first, have directly impacted Basotho citizens, particularly in the healthcare and education sectors, and have complicated diplomatic efforts to create a seamless border environment. In addition to Operation Dudula, Mavhura and Banda (2026) state that ‘March and March’ emerged as another grassroots citizen movement in 2024. In 2026, premised on concerns on undocumented immigrants in South Africa, this movement escalated its clean-up campaigns which targeted illegal immigrants as well as setting their eviction from South Africa on the 30th June 2026. ‘March and March’ has organised protests rife with anti-immigrant rhetorics in cities being Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. These protests which led to violence, looting of foreign nationals’ shops, as well as their harassment, are premised on five claims by the movement. First is that immigrants are criminals, second being that informal shop mafias are running South Africa, third is that South Africa is being invaded, fourth is that there are not enough jobs and resources for immigrants and last, that immigrants are armed by non-governmental organisations (Mavhura and Banda, 2026).
South Africa alone does not entail these antagonists thus not a sole factor to waning integration efforts, but Lesotho as well mainly spearheaded by the Basotho Covenant Movement (BCM). According to Ngubane (2025), the Lesotho land question just as in South Africa, surfaced to significance, due to rife poverty in Lesotho. The claimed land is perceived by Hornby and Ngubane (2014; 2020, as cited in Ngubane, 2025), as a remedy to crises of social reproduction for former farm workers. Should South Africa give back this land historically owned by Basotho, this restitution can lead to an expansion of small-and medium-scale farming by Basotho (Ngubane, 2025). As a result, there is a sentiment captured by the Afrobarometer (2024) survey, stating that seven in 10 Basotho (71%) say their should government exhaust its capacity to reclaim the territory that Lesotho lost to South Africa during the colonial era, therein of the 71%, 61% “strongly agree”. Furthermore, this immense support for the return of the land is more pronounced among rural and peri-urban residents than among their urban counterparts (75%-78% vs. 61%), according to the Afrobarometer (2024). At the heart of this ‘Land Reclamation’ agenda towards South Africa, is the irredentist Basotho Covenant Movement (BCM)
Led by Dr. Tšepo Lipholo, who according to Newsday (2025), as a fiery Member of Parliament (MP), BCM ignited controversy with a petition claiming that every Lesotho government since independence in 1966 has been a puppet regime controlled by Pretoria, South Africa thus thwarting land reclamation efforts. Moreover, the BCM allegations, stance and campaign, hinge on a historical grievance spanning back to the 1800s, when Basotho lands were reduced through wars with Boer settlers and British colonial agreements, particularly the 1869 Convention of Aliwal North which formalised these losses and ceded vast territories to what is now South Africa (Newsday, 2025). Furthermore, the BCM reportedly submitted a petition to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council in 2025, which invokes UN Resolutions which the BCM leader says urged Britain to address Basotho land claims prior to independence, however ignored and unresolved (Newsday, 2025).
Ultimately, this petition and debates in parliament for land reclamation propelled mainly by the BCM, render a complex, largely adversarial challenge to current integration efforts between the two countries. While a significant majority (71%) of Basotho support reclaiming lost territory, this pursuit creates political instability, disrupts existing bilateral cooperation, and introduce instability and potential for conflict, challenging the "warm relations" generally maintained between the two states.
Prospects of the current Lesotho-South integration efforts
As outlined by the International Trade Administration (2025), both Lesotho and South Africa as members of SACU, enjoy duty-free trade, a common external tariff on imports from non-member states, as well as trade opportunities with other member states of the bloc. Moreover, the colossal LHWP as stated by Mwangi (2021), is a multiphased bilateral initiative that has channelled an estimated 19580 million cubic meters of water to South Africa, according to Newsday (2025). LHWP along with Metolong Project and Sani Top road construction, have provided a strong foundation for economic growth and development in Lesotho (Mokoena and Balkaran, 2018).
Challenges of the current Lesotho-South Africa integration efforts
These limited benefits reaped by Lesotho and South Africa in their bilateral cooperation however, are confronted by several challenges. According to Hlaoli (2016), albeit Lesotho benefits from the SACU revenue as its major revenue source, South Africa by virtue of managing this arrangement, bares a significant financial obligation. Therefore, both states are economically vulnerable as SACU revenue is volatile due to depending largely on external economies amongst other factors. Akokpani (2005) further adds that economic vulnerabilities of both Lesotho and South Africa within the SACU agreement, are furthered in Lesotho’s context by the Common Monetary Area (CMA). CMA within the SACU agreement, has pegged Lesotho’s currency, along with that of Namibia and Eswatini, to the South African Rand for a stronger currency against the dollar. This arrangement however, renders Lesotho’s vulnerability to the Rand, as evident in 2001 and 2002, when Lesotho waned in attracting and keeping professionals as salaries lost their monetary value in dollar terms (Akokpani, 2005).
Deeper integration likelihood between these two states as limited and challenged as it is already, is waned further by a seemingly lagging political will from both Lesotho and South Africa. In Lesotho as suggested by an irredentist sentiment captured by the Afrobarometer (2024) survey, states that seven in 10 Basotho (71%) say their government should exhaust its capacity to reclaim the territory that Lesotho lost to South Africa during the colonial era, therein of the 71%, 61% “strongly agree”. Mavhura and Banda (2026), state that the government of South Africa in response to these recent anti-immigrant demonstrations, condemned their resultant violence and rejected the 30 June eviction deadline by ‘March and March.’ Doubling down on the government’s condemnation, the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on Migration, affirmed that migration challenges will be addressed lawfully in line with humanitarian measures, while also balancing national security and regional cooperation (Mavhura and Banda, 2026). Moreover, these condemnations remain merely as rhetorics, as according to Nemakonde, Kunguma and Belle (2026), xenophobic violence as a recurrent crisis in South Africa, remains absent in its disaster risk management frameworks. This framework has instead prioritised natural and environmental hazards over socially driven identity conflicts. Instead, the Department of Home Affairs (2026) states that, the government of South Africa is strengthening measures on border controls, to combat unlawful entry, illicit trade and fraudulent activities which challenge revenue collection and rule of law. The government of South Africa further introduced the Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) system, aimed to enhance management of movement of people in a secure, transparent and efficient manner (Department of Home Affairs, 2026).
Civil society intervention particularly in South Africa against anti-immigrant sentiments and vigilantism which bedevil Lesotho and South Africa integration likelihood, has entailed a coalition of trade unions, civil society organisations traditional and religious leaders. Mashishi (2026) indicates that on 29 June 2026, one hundred and sixty (160) civil society organisations, urged disgruntled South Africans to direct their frustrations over unemployment crisis, inequality and service delivery failures, to the government not immigrants. Leaders from the South African Council of Churches, called for South Africans to refrain from violent means of demonstration on 30 June 2026. The council further affirmed that churches will remain a refuge for displaced immigrants. There are also organisations such as the ‘Thembisile Crisis Committee’ (TCC), which pledged protection of immigrants as well as foreign-owned businesses in south of Johannesburg (Mashishi, 2026).
Recommendations
To revitalize bilateral integration and mitigate the escalating "spill-back" dynamic, Lesotho and South Africa must transcend beyond symbolic, state-level Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to a robust, institutionally backed regional governance model that addresses both grassroots grievances and structural interdependencies. Both governments should formally institutionalise joint border, healthcare, and security frameworks through the Binational Commission to guarantee basic rights, such as healthcare access, for Basotho immigrants. To effectively counter the current anti-immigration vigilantism, South Africa ought to implement stricter legal enforcement, as well as integrate xenophobic violence and identity conflicts directly into its national disaster risk management frameworks to mitigate grassroots vigilante actions before they escalate into diplomatic impasses. To de-escalate the populist appeal of the Basotho Covenant Movement's (BCM) irredentist land reclamation agenda, Lesotho should channel its socio-economic pressures into constructive regional economic development programs such as expanding Phase II of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) and leveraging SACU mechanisms, in order to foster tangible, equitable economic gains that directly alleviate rural poverty and reinforce mutual dependence over territorial conflict.
Conclusion
The economic and resource interdependence between Lesotho and South Africa, advanced by joint initiatives such as SACU and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, demonstrates that bilateral integration remains essential for Lesotho and South Africa. However, this paper illustrates that top-down diplomatic efforts, such as the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC) and signed Memorandums of Understanding, are increasingly neutralized by bottom-up nationalist currents. On the South African side, anti-immigration vigilantism led by populist groups like Operation Dudula as well as March and March, violently deprive Basotho migrants of basic human rights and healthcare access, while South Africa’s official policy response focuses heavily on securitised border controls rather than addressing systemic xenophobia. Concurrently, Lesotho’s growing irredentist movement, driven by the Basotho Covenant Movement, and backed by widespread public sentiment, reignites historical territorial grievances that threaten diplomatic trust. Viewed through the theoretical lens of neo-functionalist "spill-back," these dual forces of xenophobia and irredentism, expose a severe disconnect between state-level integration goals and societal-level resistance. Ultimately, unless both governments move beyond symbolic MoUs to implement institutionalised border and healthcare protections, integrate social conflict into disaster risk management, and address rural poverty through equitable development, formal integration between Lesotho and South Africa will continue to stall under the weight of populist fragmentation.
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Author's Note
This discussion evaluates how divergent, populist grassroots movements undermine integration prospects between Lesotho and South Africa. It aims to highlight the socio-economic frustrations at societal levels, extending to and potentially directing national foreign policy. It therefore pertains to all stakeholders being policy makers, government officials and academics, as well as civil society organisations and international organisations, to acquire more in their roles of translating integration efforts between Lesotho and South Africa, into actionable pathways and not mere political rhetorics.